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Conducted by Martin Bosman and Leila Barre 
disClosure Editorial Collective 
Lexington, Kentucky 
April 10, 1993 
~sClo.sure~ Before we ask you about various aspects of your writing, we would 
like to mqwre where you see your work, including your writings with Ernesto 
Laclau, located within the current political environment of postmodemism, 
post-colonialism, feminism, etc.? 
~!al Mouffe: First, I want to explain what our idea was with Hegemony and 
So~~list Strategy and then on the basis of that make references. When we began 
wr1~g Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, which was the beginning of the 80s, it 
was m the context of what was perceived as some kind of double crisis of 
socialism. On one side there was the crisis of Marxism, which as more theoreti-
cal questioning of the theory of Marxism was linked to the critique of what was 
happening in the Soviet Union and really existing socialism. But the main 
aspect was the critique of Marxism as a theory. Next to that were also the so-
called crisis of the welfare state, the crisis of social democracy, the emergence 
of the new movements. So there was some kind of feeling that the socialist 
project in both the social democratic and its Marxist form was in crisis and 
needed to be reformulated. And that is very much the kind of issue we wanted 
to address in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
We intended to address it at two levels. In terms of theoretical approach, 
we felt, for instance, that there were many important new theoretical develop-
ments, particularly around post-structuralism which were important and 
needed to be taken into account in the reformulation of a critical theory. And 
the center point of that objective was the critique of essentialism; that was at the 
center of our reflection. We wanted to bring to bear the critique of essentialism 
on the reformulation of the socialist project. Of course we also wanted to take 
account of the emergence of what were called the new movements and try to see 
how, for instance, the merits of feminism and the critique of traditional models 
~f socialism brought by feminism were important, and we wanted to bring that 
Into the reformulation of the socialist project. So, in a sense, our aim was to 
address the challenge the new movements were posing to the socialist project 
an4 to reformulate that socialist project in a way which was theoretically sound 
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and, also that would make room for a series of new democratic struggle which 
had not so far been incorporated into the socialist project. Obviously there was 
a relation between the theoretical and the political aspects because we consid-
ered that in order to make room for feminism and other new movements it was 
necessary to challenge the essentialism of Marxist theory. We thought that it 
was not only a question of adding feminist demands or demands around 
sexuality and race to the list of already existing demands, but that in fact there 
was a need to reformulate the theory in order to make room for those demands. 
So, it is in that context that we began to work on Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, and we ended up in fact advocating the need to reformulate the 
socialist project in terms of "radical and plural democracy". So, in a sense, this 
work can be seen as post-Marxist. We insisted that it was post in the sense that 
it was going further than Marxism. But it was posf-Marxist also, insisting on the 
fact that it was not anti-Marxist. It was an attempt to take account of what was 
important in the critique of Marxism. For instance, and this is something which 
I think is really misunderstood by our critics, we said that concerning the 
question of the critique of class and the critique of capitalist relations, there was 
still very important aspects in Marxism which needed to be taken into account. 
It was not that we ever wanted to get rid of the critique of class and replace that 
by the new movements. But we saw a need to articulate the struggle around 
class with the struggle around issues of gender, race, sexual orientation and the 
environment. So, it is not something which attempts to abandon the struggle 
around class at all. 
But we also in fact came to the conclusion that a project of socialism, as it 
was formulated, did not leave enough space for other democratic struggles. 
And that is why we insisted on the need to reformulate that struggle around 
radical and plural democracy in which the socialist goals would become part of 
that struggle-an important part but not the only one. We asserted the need to 
articulate all the struggles against relations of subordination in order to create 
a chain of equivalence among all the struggles. So, in a sense, this was an 
attempt to reformulate the identity of the Left both in terms of the kind of theory 
which was important, and here, I think post-structuralism was certainly the 
most important element in our critique, and from the point of view of politics, 
where the main influence on us was the new movements--feminism, the 
environment, and the struggle around other relations of subordination. So, that 
was how we came to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. It was in order to 
answer those questions that we put forward the project of radi~ and plural 
democracy. 
disQosure: Can you specify what the project of "radical and plural democ-
racy" is all about? 
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Mouffe: One.~g I want t~ insist on is that radical and plural democracy, as 
w~p~esented1t, didnotreqwreaRevolution witha capital Rora breakwith the 
p~~ples of modern democracy, because we consider that if one takes the 
pnncrples of modern democracy to be equality and liberty for all, there is no 
need to ~d more r~di~ principles to organize society. We felt that the 
problem WI~ our societies was not the professed ideals, but that those ideals 
were not put mto practice in those societies. As a result, the Left tended to see 
those ideals as shams~~ say 'th~e societies claim that they are equal but in fact 
they are not e.qual so;1etles. So let s get rid of our societies and build something 
completely different . That of course was what led to the idea of revolutions and 
the need to build something completely different from scratch. But we felt that 
it ~~ mu~ more important to try to transform society on the basis of its 
pnncrples instead ~f trying ~ build from scratch, because this was what really 
was shown to be disastrous m the case of the Soviet Union. 
So, the project of radical and plural democracy must be understood as a 
radicalization of the principles of liberal democracy, not as something which 
requires a break with liberal democracy. Of course, here I am referring to liberal 
democracy ~ a political system. I don't believe that liberal democracy, 
~de~tood m the way in which I use it, requires the component of economic 
liberalism. I think that one must distinguish in what we call liberalism between 
1) political liberalism, which is the aspect of liberalism which I will revindicate: 
the idea of pluralism, the idea of individual freedoms, the distinction between 
~e public. and ~e private, the rule of law, which are very important contribu-
~ons ~f hberalism to modern democracy, and 2) the aspect of economic 
liber~m, which has to do with the economic system. And there is no necessary 
relation between the two. Of course, many Right-wing liberals insist that you 
cannot have modem democracy or pluralism without capitalism but that is 
something that I question because I think that there is no necessary relation. 
Our aim was to show that within the context of liberal pluralism and 
democracy, understood as a regime (and here I insist thatwith "a regime" I refer 
not just to a mode of government or set of institutions, but to a symbolic 
ordering of social relation, a way in which the political community as a whole 
is envisaged, expressing by that a series of normative views which espouse the 
principles of liberty and equality), we could in fact develop an immanent 
critique which, instead of rejecting the society on the basis of the fact that it did 
not put into practice the idea (which is in general the line followed by the Left), 
tries to force those societies to implement those ideas. That is whatl understand 
by "immanent critique". Or one could also say that it is a question of using the 
symbolic resources of modem democracy in order to develop it, to radicalize it. 
~e definition of radical and plural democracy consists in giving a specific 
Interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality for all because those 
principles can of course be understood in very different ways. Liberty can be 
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understood in very different ways, and so too with equality. This is a c~ntested 
question. In fact, the idea of radical and plural democrac_r tended to bnng m~re 
and more democratic subjects into the "we" and also widen the scope of social 
relations to which the principles of liberty and equality shall apply. 
One of the arguments we made in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, is ~at 
we can see the evolution of democracy over the last 200 years as an extension 
of those principles that all men are all free and equal, and that is what constitutes 
the specificity of what is called democratic revolu~on. But, of course, by "men" 
they only meant male, white and not even all white males because you ~ad to 
have some degree of property in order to become free. So, the evolution of 
democracy seems to be a widening of its scope in the sense that more. pe?ple 
were being included into the whole. This is in the sense that first the cntena of 
property were abandoned and mo~e men ~~re ~rought in and l~ter won_ien 
demanded their rights, and then with the Civil Rights movement m Amenca, 
for instance, the Blacks also became part of that movement for democracy. So, 
once those rights had been affirmed, they were claimed by more and more 
groups. 
That was one level of development which we can call "horizontal." B.ut 
there was also a "vertical development" which consisted in new areas of social 
relations in which the principles of equality were implem~ted in th~ sens~ that, 
for instance, they did not limit themselves strictly to the idea of .nghts m.~e 
political sphere but also to the idea of equali~ ~ economic relations. This IS 
what I consider to be the novelty of the socialist goal. And of course, the 
specificity of what we call the "Third Wave" of democratic revolutions was that 
relations which were still considered naturally unequal, as between the sexes 
and races also came to be con tested. So, the principles of equality were pushed 
into more areas of social relations. It is very much in that context that we 
presented the project of radical and plural democracy as ~ing to push even 
further the area in which equality should become the dommant value and also 
the multiplicity of subjects that will be taken into account .. And that is why we 
insist also on the idea of a "plural" democracy because it takes many more 
democratic struggles into account. 
So, the relation between our project and a liberal project consists not in 
rejecting liberalism completely because this had been the ~ig mistake .of the Left 
in general, particularly, of course, the Marxist Left:, that is, ~e~ be~ev;d that 
liberties \.Vere formal liberties, or what they called bourgeois liberties . And 
obviously this is something that the experience of the Soviet Union and 
dictatorships in many parts of the world proved to be wrong. When those 
liberties do not exist, they come to be valued as very important. So, we felt that 
those so-called formal liberties were not to be seen as they had been seen by the 
Left, usually as some kind of cover~up for bourgeois domination. There were 
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aspects in liberalism which had radical potential. And that is why I insisted on 
the need to distinguish between economic liberalism and political liberalism. 
The Left had to come to terms with that and revindicate instead of trying to 
reject those ideals. [They have] to try to disarticulate the connection that had 
been made between capitalism and liberal democracy and show that, in fact, 
one could perfectly struggle against capitalism and at the same time maintain 
a struggle for pluralist democracy. And that is very much what the project of 
radical and plural democracy is about. So it should be seen, if we think at the 
level of the political regime, that radical and plural democracy does not require 
a break with constitutional democracy. It is understood as one radical way to 
interpret its [modem democracy's] principles. And of course, we also recognize 
that there will always be other competing ways of understanding liberty and 
equality. · And that's what the political struggle is about. 
For instance, there is a neo-conservative way of understanding which 
tends to limit the idea of equality and limit the "we" and there is a neo-liberal 
way which very much insists on the centrality of market relations and capital-
ism to the very idea of modem plural democracy. And there will always be a 
contest about that. So, liberal and plural democracy is, and this is a point I want 
to stress here, not some kind of completely radically different type of society. It 
is not that, for instance, at some point we will pass a threshold and we will no 
longer be in a liberal democracy. It is more of way thinking about politics, of 
understanding political struggle. It is not an end state. And, in fact, it means 
that there are obviously no guarantees. 
dis Closure: Now, if this is the case, then the question becomes how the thrust 
towards "radical democracy" can be keep course, without erring, or being co-
opted? What are the dangers you see for the project of "radical and plural 
democracy"? 
Mouffe: Well, there are obviously no guarantees. 
disQosure: No guarantees that it, radical democracy, will be achieved? 
Mouffe: The problem is this. The very idea of achievement is something I want 
to put into question because it [politics] is an unending process. 
disCloswe: Collectively and individually? 
Mouffe: Yes. It is very important to understand the centrality of pluralism. I 
think it is a crucial idea in radical and plural democracy. It is what we could call 
a self-refuting ideal in the sense that if it could ever be achiev~d it ~oul~ self-
destruct because it would cease to be pluralistic. Imagine a society m which, at 
some point, we will say that we have achieved radical democracy. Therefore at 
this moment we have achieved the end. 
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disClosure: You mean the end of politics? 
, Mouffe: Right. No more politics, no more possibilities for contestation, no 
pluralism. So the idea of radical and plural democracy implies that we accept 
the possibility of contestation, that we accept that conflict is part of the vitality 
of a modem pluralistic democracy which, of course, means it will always 
depend on the capacity of the radical democratic forces to maintain their 
hegemony. And we can never reach a stage in which we are sure that the 
conservative or nee-liberal interpretations are not going to be able to win over. 
I think that the idea of hegemony always implies that this hegemony can be put 
into question. Always. If not in actual struggle for counter-hegemony, at least 
the possibility of counter-hegemony. The idea of hegemony means there is 
always what one can call, after Derrida, the "constitutive outside". There is 
always an "exterior" to that hegemony and this idea is also linked to a point 
central to radical democracy. It is the idea that in order to construct a "we" it 
is necessary to distinguishitfroma "them". Thereisno "we"withouta "them". 
There is no consensus which is not based on some form of exclusion. So it means 
there will never be complete absolute consensus. The "them" can always, and 
will always, try to undermine the hegemony, even if we will arrive at the 
moment when the radical democratic forces have been able to establish their 
hegemony, and that is of course what radical democratic politics should try to 
construct. But we must understand that this is never an end state because it is 
always something which will be undermined by others because there will 
always be other interpretations. 
And, in a sense, that is the danger. Well, one of the dangers could be to try 
to establish guarantees because one must accept the possibility of contestation. 
Take the risks that this implies because the search for guarantees, the search for 
trying to find a way in which no danger can come, this for me is the big danger 
because this is a way in which you are going to try to close off the democratic 
process. 
So, I think that instead of trying to find a way to avoid the danger of being 
put into a counter-hegemony, we should understand that any attempt to fix the 
institutions at a given moment is what should be avoided because that is what 
will in fact be the end of a radical democratic form of politics. This is a very 
important point. That also, by the way, distinguishes our project of radical and 
plural democracy from other understandings of radical democracy. 
For instance, I am referring to the understanding which is put forward by 
Habermas and people around him, because they also speak of radical democ-
racy. But theirs is the aim of creating a consensus without exclusion, a situation 
of undistorted communication. Even if Habermas recently recognized this or 
some kind of regulative idea that we will never reach. Bu the [Habermas] thinks 
we will not reach it because there will always be some empirical impediment 
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to reaching it. What he does not understand is that the very ideal of a society 
in which there will be an absolute rational consensus is not an ideal of a 
pluralistic democracy. So, in a sense, those forms of radical democracy aim, 
even if they recognize that they will never achieve it, for a society in which there 
will be perfect harmony. And that is what we put into question. 
dis Closure: Hannah Arendt has been a very influential theorist and social critic 
on the condition of the "public sphere". Can you speak about the relationship 
or influence of her work on your ideas about "radical and plural democracy"? 
And who are the other major theorists who have influenced your ideas on 
democracy? 
Mouffe: The question concerning Arendt and the "public sphere" depend 
upon the interpretations one gives. [In fact] one of the dominant interpretations 
of Arendt is the one which has been given by Habermas. And I definitely 
believe therefore that the critique will work in this case because there is no 
public sphere which is completely free of relations of power and domination. 
I think that is an argument that we must abandon. 
The public sphere is always created by the exclusion from that public 
sphere of things which we do not want to bring to bear on the public sphere. 
That is important. It seems that many of the ways in which Arendt is 
understood are conducive to an understanding of radical democracy which is 
different from the one that we propose precisely because of the fact that it does 
not acknowledge sufficiently the importance of conflict and antagonism. For 
instance, I think that in Arendt there is much importance given to the idea of 
plurality. She is one of the political philosophers who insisted on that. But I do 
not find that idea of plurality adequate because it is a plurality without 
antagonism. 
I think she not aware enough of the fact that pluralism necessarily implies 
the possibility of conflict and antagonism. It is too much an idea of some kind 
of happy pluralism in which people have different aims. But she does not 
acknowledge the conflict between those aims enough. And, by the way, I would 
say the same about many contemporary liberals like John Rawls, who ins~t 
very much on what they call the "fact of pluralism" and the need for Its 
acknowledgment. But I think that the dimension of conflict, what we could call 
the tragic dimension of pluralism of value, is something which is not acknowl-
edged by liberals. This is the problem with Arendt's understanding. 
disOosure: We want now to shift your ideas to "other" contexts (post-colonial 
ones, if you will), and ask about some of the concrete possibilities and applica-
tions of your project for a "non-Western" world. In a theoretical project such 
as yours, where notions of difference and specificity are paramount, how 
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important is it to consider differences between ''Western" and "non-Western" 
contexts? Do you see distinction, where they exist, as fundamental to the 
process of building a "radical and plural democracy"? 
Mouffe: Well, one thing I will start by saying is that in order to radicalize the 
principles of modem democracy, you must have the basis of democratic 
institutions. You cannot radicalize something that does not already exist. In 
that sense, I do not think that the idea of revolution has become completely 
obsolete because I think that in countries where there are no democratic 
systems, where you have either totalitarian and authoritarian systems, the very 
first step is to establish democracy. And that of course might have to take a 
violent form or the form of revolution. That is not necessarily so, but one must 
not exclude that possibility. So the idea of radical democracy does not ~p~y 
that the idea of revolution must be definitely abandoned. What I am saying is 
that where the institutions of pluralism and democracy already exist, there is no 
need to have a revolution in order to begin the process. What must be done is 
to try to radicalize those principles. But where those institutions do not exist, 
obviously, there is a need first to establish those institutions. And that 
obviously might be the case for many or a certain number of non-Western 
countries. 
Another point I want to make concerning that, which may lead to many 
other questions about radical and plural democracy, is that it is a way to think 
about politics and the Left project from a non-vanguardist perspective. In that 
way it is of course very critical of the Leninist conception in which there were 
some people who knew what people were supposed to do and were able to tell 
them to do so. This [radical democracy] is something which starts much more 
from the grassroots in the sense that it must in each place start from the 
movement that already exists and try to articulate those movements instead of 
trying to impose already worked out institutions or ideas on ~e movem~t or 
society. And that is why I think, for instance, there are a senes of que~tto~s 
which a radical democratic theory should in fact refuse to answer because it will 
imply that we know best about how society should be organized. I~ ~t 
these issues should be Left to the different movements to find the ways m which 
they want to organize society. 
We wanted to present a way to think about politics but also leave lots ~f 
space for people to organize in the different ways in which they want to do it. 
And that is why the project of radical and plural democracy is also very 
historically specific. It is going to take different forms in the United States, 
South Africa, Britain, and even in France and Italy because in some places 
unions are going to play more important roles because of the tradition, or in 
other places the gay movement is going to play a more important role. There 
must not be one single answer to apply to all societies. 
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I also think that the very understanding of democracy might be different 
according to different historical and cultural contexts. The way in which it is 
going to dominate in liberal democratic societies is very much influenced by a 
certain tradition which in the West is the Judeo-Christian culture. This 
[tradition] is also w hat has created a certain conception of the individual which 
is linked to an understanding of the difference between the public and the 
private, and individual rights. It seems to me that it need not necessarily be the 
same in African countries, for instance, where there is more of a community 
form. And I don' t think that liberal democratic institutions are the panacea for 
the rest of the world. 
I think it is also very important as democracy spreads to other contexts that 
there be new forms of understanding, new institutions, which are more 
adequate for the expression of dem ocratic demands. For instance, I am 
particularly thinking of African societies in which forms of communities are 
different from the ones existing in the West. There should be ways in which 
interests are represented. I don't think, for instance, that the kind of represen-
tative democracy, the parliamentary system, dominant in the West is necessar-
ily adequate for those contexts. I think that democracy should take different 
forms. The democratic ideals should take different forms, adapting themselves, 
emerging in different ways according to the different historical and cultural 
contexts. 
disaosure: What happens when the people are told that notions such as 
"equality, liberty and democracy" did not exist in their languages? I am 
thinking about the former French colonial Empires. What happens, moreover, 
when these people go to elections to cast their ballots to move to "democracy" 
and it backfires? 
Mouffe: Are you are thinking about the situation in Algeria? 
disQosure: That is just one example. People [in Algeria] were moving towards 
a sort of European framew ork where people suddenly make "choices". It was 
hard on people. So, it took all theirtime toimplementtheEnlightenmentproject 
for the first time and, for the first time, there was "consensus." And at the same 
time "plurality" was at work. 
Mouffe: Yes, but if one takes the case of Algeria, which is very complicated and 
I actually don't have any answer for that because ... 
disCosure: ... actually, just keep it general without actually citing Algeria 
because it hasn't only happened there. 
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Mouffe: Yes, but you asked what were the reasons that it backfired. Usu~y 
it is because the leaders realize that the results of the ballot box were not going 
to be the ones they wanted. So, they were ready to have elections only as ~ong 
as those elections were going to produce the results that they wanted. This, of 
course, is something which is going to discredit the democratic process with the 
people who voted and then were denied the results of their elections. And I am 
particularly worried about the present situation with respect to the Arab ~orld, 
for instance, because I think we are living at a moment when the very idea of 
democracy has become discredited. 
I think that the Gulf War was an extremely negative moment because the 
idea of democracy and rights were undermined. That war took place in the 
name and in defense of human rights and, of course, the reaction against that 
is a discrediting of those ideas because they are now perceived as mere ideology 
on the basis of [which] powerful countries impose their own interests, particu-
larly when people see that they don't do ~e same when it is questioned in [the 
case of] Israel expelling Palestinians. So it has become very much a cover. But 
what I am saying here is that liberalism is a very impo~t ~dea which m~st be 
appropriated by the Left and fought for. I am also. reco~g that th~se ideas 
are very often used as a cover for the simple purswt of their CW este.rn] mteres~. 
But that should not mask the fact that nevertheless there is also radical potentlal 
there. And that is what the whole question of hegemonic struggle is about you 
see. 
I don't think one should leave the idea of democracy and rights to the 
Right-wing. That has been, for too long, the tendency of the Left. That is, to say 
that democracy and liberalism are only Right-wing ideas. This is dangero~ 
because these are very important ideas thatneed to be re-articulated, appropri-
ated by the Left, not Left to the Right because of their consequ~nces in ~e ~ab 
world which I know a little about because I have been following the situatton 
I I • 
in Algeria. For a series of reasons, such as the Gulf War, the c~~p d etat m 
Algeria, people don't believe in democracy anymore because this IS seen as a 
way, a discourse, which the Western world is using but does not at all want to 
put into practice. 
disClosure: Would there be some long or short-term strategies that "radical" 
democracy can provide so that people would not see democracy as something 
that is discredited but rather as something than can be strengthened and 
reinforced? What are some of the elements to make it work? 
Mouffe: We thought that there were no guarantees. It is a question of how able 
the democratic forces are to implement a hegemony. Obviously this is difficult 
enough in our societies in which those ideas are more or less accepted by 
everybody. And, of course, it is even more difficult in societies in which, as you 
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were saying, have been told that this was something that was imported and was 
therefore not part of their tradition, which, by the way, I think was wrong, 
because the idea of democracy is something that can be found in many different 
cultures. But, of course, it takes different forms and that is why I think it is very 
important·not to believe that the very specific form that it takes in the West is 
necessarily the only one. Because if you don't find it you say, "well those 
countries don't have a tradition of democracy the~fore the solution for them is 
to import the Western conception,". That is the big danger because it is going 
to create lots of problems. 
First, I think Western traditions will probably not be suited to the condi-
tions in those societies. Second, they might very easily be seen as imports and 
as imperialistic. So, it is going to create a reaction which is, by the way, what 
happened in Iran. It was a reaction to the Shah's attempt to import Western 
democracy. This is in fact something which tends to create a reaction against 
it, leading to the complete rejection of the very idea of democracy. What can you 
do if you live in Iran and are committed to the idea of radical democracy? I think 
the answer would be to try to highlight democratic elements in Islamic culture 
and try to articulate them and put them to the fore, to start from their tradition 
and tty to develop and radicalize the democratic elements of that tradition. 
That is something I often discuss with people who know the Moslem world. 
There are many different interpretations of Islam and there are some interpre-
tations which are really democratic interpretations. So what is important is to 
try, instead of coming with imported ideas about the Western understanding 
of democracy, to start from their tradition and build from there. I think that is 
what is needed and what a radical democratic understanding of politics 
implies! You start from your tradition and develop from there and you don't 
try to import ideas because this is completely opposite to a democratic under-
standing [of politics]. 
disClosure: How can one actually take local tribalism, which may be another 
form of the democratic tradition, or ethnic diversities and pluralities, that one 
finds in many parts of Africa, Latin America and ex-Yugoslavia and tum those 
traditions into starting points for "radical and plural democracy"? To follow 
your logic, should they be interrogated for democratic elements and on that 
basis build? Can you please clarify this issue? 
Mouffe: Yes, yes... One thing that p robably relates to that is that a radical 
democratic understanding of politics requires not only that we start from the 
tradition but also, for instance, it needs to go through and not against the 
existing forms of community. For instance, I think that nationalism is some-
thing that should not be considered as archaic or something to be overturned. 
It is starting from those identities and, of course, trying to link those with 
democracy. That is the important point: to try to see how one can articulate 
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those strong identities, where they exist, instead of negating them and believing 
them to be something negative-a resurgence of the past, archaic, or something 
that must be overcome. No, [there is a need] to work through nationalism and 
not negate it because, I think, those are forms of identity which are important 
for people and which should not necessarily be an impediment to democracy. 
I don't think that a strong sense of belonging to an ethnic group or nationality 
is something that is contradictory to a commitment to radical democracy. 
Of course, the question is how that is articulated and how it is worked 
through democratically and in that sense you can see a very interesting 
difference between what is happening in ex-Yugoslavia, in the case of Slovenia 
and Croatia. Croatia is using its [nationalism] in a profoundly authoritarian 
way. There is no freedom of the press, there is control and the aspect of tradition 
that is being emphasized is more the ustachi and there is really no critique of 
that. It is a Right-wing articulation of nationalism. 
In Slovenia, the case is completely different. In Slovenia, the people have 
a more Left-wing government and, for instance, in Slovenia they have very 
much tried to articulate Slovenian identity in terms of democratic forms. So, 
this is an interesting case because it shows you that in both cases they have 
insisted on their national identity but they have constructed it in different ways. 
And, I think, the whole question of radical democracy is to link those identities 
with the democratic institutions and forms, not to negate those identities but to 
articulate them with democratic issues. 
disClosure: Do you see "nodal points" as processes or temporo-spatial 
positions? 
Mouffe: The issue of nodal points is relevant to what we are discussing here. 
Let me first define the idea of nodal points. The idea is something which is 
borrowed from Lacanian psycho-analysis and it is, of course, linked to our 
understanding of the subject as not being something which is an essence 
already, existing independently from its inscription into social relations as it is, 
for instance, in much socialist theory or in liberalism. 
The subject is constructed in a multiplicity of subject positions. That, also, 
is a point which makes our idea different from any extreme forms of 
postmodemism, because we believe that [subjectivities] are always temporary 
forms of fixation. The subject is not that endless, constantly changing thing. 
There are forms of identification which, at a given moment, are temporarily 
fixed and they are fixed through nodal points: temporary articulations that fix 
the meaning either of subjectivity or politics, because nodal points are do not 
only refer to the subject. Let us say, in a given culture the "commonsense" is 
articulated in certain hegemonic forms. . 
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Nodal points must.also be understood in terms of articulation and hege-
mony because the creation of hegemony is the fixation of a certain number of 
no.d~ points. For ~tance, in the case of the p rinciples of liberty and equality, 
pnncrples can be given rruu:iy different interpretations. But at a given moment, 
they are more or less w hat IS the most accepted interpretation, the one that we 
could call, with Gramsci, the "commonsense". And those are also the result of 
n~dal points: F~r instan~e, a nodal point will articulate a certain idea of equality 
WI~ a certain idea of liberty. For instance, if we had a nodal point that is 
articulated by a neo-liberal interpretation it would link the meaning of democ-
racy with the existence of economic liberalism. And as I said, there is no 
nece~ re~ation. But at a given moment, there are always constructed 
rel~tions which are the result of political interpretations and those are nodal 
points. 
~,nodal points are temporary fixations which are the -result of political 
practice. ~d. of course, the hegemonic struggle consists in disarticulating the 
no~al points m order to reconstruct them in a different way. For instance, 
radical ~emocra~c types ~f politic are going to try to disarticulate the meaning 
of e~ualitJ:' and hberty which has been constructed through a neo-conservative 
or liberal interpretation in order to re-articulate them in different ways. So, 
there are always nodal points. They [nodal points] are not really processes in 
themselves, but the result of processes of hegemony. They are more some kind 
of temporal-spatial positions. They are the result of partial fixations which are 
the product of a given hegemony. But of course they are always temporary in 
the sense that there is always the possibility that they will be disarticulated since 
th~ are not totalized because there is always the possibility of further interpre-
tations. 
For instance, if one accepts that liberty and equality are things for which 
there are no "true" interpretations, one cannot imagine, as analytic philoso-
phe~ believe, that there could be a way, through very sophisticated methods, 
to fin~ out exactly what equality or liberty means. This is what an anti-
~entialist critique puts into question. There is no such a thing as ;'the trueii 
Interpretations of liberty and equality. Liberty and equality are constantly 
a:>ntested concepts and this is something where we can never come to a final 
discovery of what it is. It does not mean, [however], that a hegemony cannot 
last_ for a long time and even come to a point where its meaning becomes so 
sedimented thatitlooksabsolutelynatural. [It] isonlytheresultof a very strong 
hege~ony. And it does not mean that this [hegemony] cannot be put into 
question. 
. That is why there are never any guarantees in politics that things are not 
going to be challenged. So, that is the idea of nodal points. They are temporary 
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fixations but always the process of political articulation and therefore never 
permanent. [There is] always the possibility of putting them into question. 
disOosure: Talk, if you will, about your use of "nodal points" as opposed to 
Lyotard' s "language games" in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowl-
edge. 
Mouffe: I think, one of the differences between our conception and that of 
Lyotard, his idea of language games, for instance, is that he insis~ on m~tiplici­
ties and incommensurabilities. But it is seems to me, as something which does 
not make enough room for temporary fixations. It is as if the seamless web is 
constantly moving without realizing the results of politics. And, he [Lyotard], 
in fact sees that as something more democratic, something which is good. But 
I think that is a misunderstanding of politics which we put into question. But 
this is an important area where we follow Lyotard, in terms of the critique of 
essentialism and the idea that there is no one real or essential identity. [How-
ever], it does not mean there is no identity because there are always also partial 
fixations. So this notion is important if one wants to think in terms of politics 
and hegemony. What is definitely missing in Lyotard is the possibility of 
hegemony. 
disOosure: What about the idea of "historic blocs"? 
Mouffe: Yes, of course. The "we" against the "them". He seems to believe that 
this is something to be avoided whereas we consider the need to articulate the 
democratic struggle. This is the main difference [we have] with people like 
Lyotard. But there are also other postmodemists who insist on the multiplicity 
of struggles and the importance of those struggles but do not acknowledge the 
need to create a chain of equivalence. They see that as some kind of danger for 
democracy. 
I [on the other hand], think this is a condition of democracy and certainly 
I • 
of politics· because politics is always about the construction of coll~cttve 
identities, of "we" as opposed to "them". Politics is about the construction of 
hegemony. The danger, it seems to me, with a position like Lyotard's ~that by 
not understanding the need to construct a hegemony of the democratic forces, 
we leave the terrain open for the right to do it. And then, of course, they are 
going to be able to impose their hegemony and we will not be in a position to 
fight back because of the insistence on the incommensurability of the demc:r 
cratic struggle and the need for each to follow his/her own movement. This 
puts u.S in a situation which is not favorable with respect to the Right because 
the Right usually understands very well the need to construct a hegemony. So 
I think it is important to understand this point. 
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disClosure: Can you speak about how, in environments where Lacanian 
theories are marginal, would there be other ways of thinking about the politics 
of "radical and plural democracy"? 
Mouffe: We, of course, in our work have been inspired by post-structuralism 
and by Lacanian psycho-analysis. But the critique of essentialism, which is after 
all what is important, can also be made from other points of view. And even 
people who would not be familiar with psycho-analysis, I think, can arrive at 
similar conclusions. For instance, they might have been inspired by post-
Heideggerian hermeneutics. For instance, the work of Gadamer and his idea of 
"the fusion of horizons" could also lead to something along the same lines as 
whatlamproposinghere. Or,obviously,workinspiredbythelateWittgenstein 
can also lead to the critique of essentialism. So, the critique of essentialism is not 
only found in post-structuralism. In fact, I would argue that this is one of the 
trends we find in the most important current of contemporary philosophy. 
And there are others. I am thinking, for instance, of the work of Bill 
Connolly who is more influenced by Nietzsche and who has come to rather 
similar conclusions as ours in terms of the idea of the subject. So, there are many 
different ways, many theoretical points from which one can come to that same 
understanding. So, one does not necessarily need to come from psy~o­
analysis in order to have that anti-essentialist understanding of the subject. 
There are many other theoretical spectrums from which one can make it. 
disClosure: Are there any other theorists who have had a strong influence on 
your thinking? You have already mentioned some, like Gadame:: Nietzs~e 
and Wittgenstein. Are there any others who are part of your theoretical 
horizon of understanding", so to speak? Who predominates? 
Mouffe: Yes, I would say that Wittgenstein and Gadamer are important. But, 
obviously, the main influences in our work were Foucault, Derrida, Lac.an, 
Sa~ure, and Barth es, to speak from the point of view of the post-structuralists 
spectrum. Yes, those are the most important ones because those are the ones 
who defined the specificity of the project. And of course, there is Gramsci. ~e 
was extremely important even if we ended up critiquing him. But there are still 
many important aspects of Grarnsci I will revindicate. 
So, Gramsci from the point of view of Marxism, and Althusser.to a certain 
extant. I was very much influenced by Althusser. In fact, chronologically, I ~as 
influenced by Althusser, and then by Gramsci and then by post-structuralism 
and Lacan. And that is what really constituted the theoretical framework of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Then, in more recent wo~k, I ha:e .been 
working mainly with Wittgenstein. Also, to a certain extent with certain ideas 
of Gadamer. I am also interested in the work of Michael Oakshott. But these 
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[authors], I would say, do not have the same importance as the previous ones 
[simply] because the previous influences were the ones that determined the 
basic framework of our work. 
Note, for instance, my interest in Oakshott is more limited to certain aspects. In 
developing certain themes, I am interested in different authors but they will not 
play the same role because the main line of the project has already been 
established. At the moment, the most important influence is probably 
Wittgenstein. 
disClosure: What about Nicos Poulantzas, who is key to the Althusserian 
tradition? He also tried to theorize and problematize the "political" in a manner 
similar to what you are trying to do. Is there any influence here? 
Mouffe: No, I don't think so. There was much discussion with Poulantzas 
whom I knew quite well. But there was never a direct influence. We were both 
influenced by Althusser but then I became more interested in Gramsci and 
Poulantzas was very critical of Gramsci at that time. He interpreted Gramsci in 
a way I disagreed with. I had lots of polemics with him about that. But 
influence, no, because I tended to disagree more with him. We were interested 
in common subjects but giving different emphases. Well, except his very last 
book, which was in fact much nearer to me and to our [with Laclau] position on 
hegemony. So, who knows how he might have evolved after that. For instance, 
Political Classes was a work I had lots of disagreement with, but the very last 
Poulantzas [book], I felt we had a meeting point. 
disClosure: Could you perhaps be more specific about the influence of 
Althusser on your thinking, because there is a strong suggestion in certain 
critiques of your work thatyou,in fact,completelyrejectAlthusser. But it seems 
that on the basis of what you have said so far during this interview, you and 
Laclau are not interested in rejecting, but in building upon, past traditions. For 
example, in your discussion of the democratic tradition, did you not say that we 
should not reject tout court but rather build or reappropriate the most critical 
radical elements of other traditions? So, could you be more specific about 
Althusser's relationship to your work? 
Mouffe: Althusser was very influential in my evolution, not, I will say, on my 
current work because when we began to write Hegemony and Socialist Strat-
egy, I had already become very critical of what I felt to be a strong theoretic ism 
inAlthusser. And by, thattime,IwasalreadymuchmoreinterestedinGramsci. 
But Althusser was important because I was his student. The moment I came 
across Althusser, I was a humanist Marxist working on Lukacs and I changed 
radically under the influence and became very critical of historicism and Hegel 
and was, in fact, for several years some kind of orthodox Althusserian, I would 
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say. Ibegan tounderstandMarxismasascienceanditisonlywhenILeftFrance 
to te~ch in Colombia that I began to realize that such an understanding of 
Marxism was an obstacle to political practice because it did not give enough 
room. for qu~tions about the importan~e of tradition, of the national popular 
practice which I felt were absolutely rmportant if one wanted to be active 
politically. That was when I turned to Gramsci because he provided better 
perspectives on political action than Althusser. Althusser was very much the 
int~llec~al who wanted to develop a very sophisticated theory but a theory 
which did not help me very much when I had to act politically and was in fact 
cutting me very much from the possibility of understanding the specificity of 
what was happening in Latin America and in Colombia in particular. 
I still believe that it [Althusserianism] was an obstacle to acting politically. 
On the other side, what does remain of the influence of Althusser is that it is 
through Althusser that I became interested in Derrida, Lacan and Foucault. 
And that is something which, probably, if I had remained a humanistic marxist, 
I would not have been able to do. I am where I am now because Althusser was 
~ery interested in me reading these theorists. So, I think this was a very positive 
influence. But it was sort of indirect because it was not so much his ideas but 
the way he opened me to access to other things which as a Marxist I would 
probably not have read because most marxists would not have read those 
theorists. So, what remains of Althusser's influence is the influence of 
post-structuralism because it is through Althusser that I got in touch with 
poststructuralism. 
Althusserian ideas such as over-determination are things Althusser bor-
rowed from Lacan. So, I think that what remains of the influence of Althusser 
is what Althusser borrowed from post-structuralism. And of course, in my 
work on Gramsci, I was still very Althusserian in many senses because I was 
trying to maintain the idea of the determination in the last instance by the 
economy. But I was trying to provide some kind of non-economistic under-
standing of the determination of the last instance by the economic. In fact, that 
was what, when I began to work on Gramsci, I thought that Gramsci could 
provide. So, I was still Althusserian in thinking of the determination in the last 
instance but I thought that Althusser did not really provide the solution and 
that Gramsci could provide a better solution to that same problem. 
Then of course, I came to the conclusion that there was no solution to that 
problem and that one had to abandon the idea of determination in the last 
instance by the economy for the very simple reason that it did not really make 
~e to speak of the economy as if it could exist independently of the 
ideological or political relations which constituted it. And that is where, of 
course, we moved to the understanding of different discourses. Once one 
~ccepts that there is no economy which could exist without political, legal, and 
Ideological conditions of existence, then the economy can not be seen as 
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determining in the last instance those things which in fact provide its conditions 
of existence. So, one has to think in different ways. That is the conclusion we 
came to in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy but it took some time to work 
through. And of course, that is also linked to the critique which I ended up 
making of Gramsci because I, in my previous work on Gramsci before Hege-
mony and Socialist Strategy, still agreed with Gramsci on the idea that only the 
working class could provide the articulating principle of the new democratic 
hegemony. I was trying to bring in the new .movements and the importance of 
feminism and other struggles believing that there was some kind of necessary 
centrality of the working class. That is something which we abandoned in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
We came to abandon the idea that it was only the working class that could 
provide the articulating principle of a hegemony. Of course, it does not mean 
that in some countries it cannot be the working class. But in other countries it 
can be some other group and sometimes there is not even an articulating 
principle. Sometimes there is hegemony without an hegemonic center. For 
instance, it might in many cases be a situation in which no particular group is 
dominant. So, that is something I personally see as a break with my work on 
Gramsci before Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. At that point my work really 
became post-marxist because once you abandon the centrality of the working 
class you are obviously post-marxist. 
It does not mean I was rejecting everything of marxism. I still feel that there 
are many important concerns about the struggle around class which are post-
marxism' s contributions to the formulation of a left perspective. In the same 
way, feminism insists on the importance of the feminist question. I see very 
much marxism as part of a wider project but not at all as providing the theory, 
the master theory. And of course, I feel the same way with respect to feminism. 
Feminism is one component in a much wider perspective on democratic 
struggle. 
disQosure: Are there any last comments? If there are not, there is one last thing 
we would like to ask you. One gets the impression from listening and talking 
to you that your view of radical and plural democracy is related to the 
Trotskyian notion of a "permanent revolution". Could you clarify the differ-
ence for us? 
Mouffe: No, it abandons the idea of revolution. In societies like the USA or 
Western Europe, "permanent revolution" does not make sense because it 
means transforming completely the very basis of society and I do not think we 
need that. All the goals of radical democracy, and I would say even the socialist 
goals in terms of the democratization of the economy, can be done perfectly well 
within the current tradition. 
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to the University of Kentucky to give the lecture "Economic Democracy and Democratic 
Organizations" as part of the 1993 Spring Social Theory Lecture Series sponsored by 
the university's interdisciplinary Committee on Social Theory. It is divided into three 
parts; the first dealing with concepts of the state and uneven geographical development, 
the second dealing with the recent resurgence of interest in the ideas of 11 civil society" 
and the 11 end of history11 and the third with economic and political transition in Eastern 
Europe. 
I. State, Power and Uneven Development 
Popke: I think a good way to lead this interview off is to refer to the institutional 
accommodations that you spoke of in Democracy and Capitalism. In the last 
chapter you outline three distinct possibilities for the future articulations of 
political and economic formations: "global-liberalism," which would entail the 
worldwide growth of markets and capital mobility so as to erode national 
sovereignty; "neo-Hobbesianism," which represents an expansion of hierarchi-
cal institutions of authority in the political sphere; and "postliberal democ-
racy," which combines decentralized control of productive forces with demo-
cratic control of the economy. What can you say about contemporary conditions 
and their dynamics, given these three models? 
Bowles: Well, of these obviously the most vibrant power in the world today is 
global liberalism. The spread of free trade as an ideology and set of social 
policies is a powerful movement in the world today and it has found support 
in a lot of historically unprecedented places. It has found strong support among 
many Third World governments; as exemplified by Mexico's enthusiastic 
support of the North American so-called free trade agreement. So I think that 
global liberalism is the dominant tendency in the world today. It will pose the 
dominant challenge to the Left, which will have to address the issue of 
increased mobility of goods and services in the world. This will be a challenge 
to find ways of continuing to express the hopes and aspirations of working 
people in an arena in which capital is more than ever willing to use the threat 
of mobility against populist and democratic movements. 
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